The Role of Central Banks in Banking Crises
By Sam Vaknin
palma[at]unet.com.mk
http://samvak.tripod.com
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Central
banks are relatively new inventions. An American President
(Andrew Jackson) even cancelled its country's central bank in the
nineteenth century because he did not think that it was very
important. But things have changed since. Central banks today are
the most important feature of the financial systems of most
countries of the world.
Central banks are a bizarre hybrids. Some of their functions
are
identical to the functions of regular, commercial banks. Other
functions are unique to the central bank. On certain functions it
has an absolute legal monopoly.
Central banks take deposits from other banks and, in certain
cases,
from foreign governments which deposit their foreign exchange and
gold reserves for safekeeping (for instance, with the Federal
Reserve Bank of the USA). The Central Bank invests the foreign
exchange reserves of the country while trying to maintain an
investment portfolio similar to the trade composition of its client -
the state. The Central bank also holds onto the gold reserves of
the country. Most central banks have lately tried to get rid of
their gold, due to its ever declining prices. Since the gold is
registered in their books in historical values, central banks are
showing a handsome profit on this line of activity. Central banks
(especially the American one) also participate in important,
international negotiations. If they do not do so directly - they
exert influence behind the scenes. The German Bundesbank virtually
dictated Germany's position in the negotiations leading to the
Maastricht treaty. It forced the hands of its co-signatories to
agree to strict terms of accession into the Euro single currency
project. The Bunbdesbank demanded that a country's economy be
totally stable (low debt ratios, low inflation) before it is
accepted as part of the Euro. It is an irony of history that Germany
itself is not eligible under these criteria and cannot be accepted
as a member in the club whose rules it has assisted to formulate.
But all these constitute a secondary and marginal portion of central banks' activities.
The main function of a modern central bank is the monitoring
and
regulation of interest rates in the economy. The central bank does
this by changing the interest rates that it charges on money that it
lends to the banking system through its "discount windows".
Interest
rates is supposed to influence the level of economic activity in the
economy. This supposed link has not unequivocally proven by economic
research. Also, there usually is a delay between the alteration of
interest rates and the foreseen impact on the economy. This makes
assessment of the interest rate policy difficult. Still, central
banks use interest rates to fine tune the economy. Higher interest
rates - lower economic activity and lower inflation. The reverse is
also supposed to be true. Even shifts of a quarter of a percentage
point are sufficient to send the stock exchanges tumbling together
with the bond markets. In 1994 a long term trend of increase in
interest rate commenced in the USA, doubling interest rates from 3
to 6 percent. Investors in the bond markets lost 1 trillion (=1000
billion!) USD in 1 year. Even today, currency traders all around the
world dread the decisions of the Bundesbank and sit with their eyes
glued to the trading screen on days in which announcements are
expected.
Interest rates is only the latest fad. Prior to this -
and under the
influence of the Chicago school of economics - central banks used to
monitor and manipulate money supply aggregates. Simply put, they
would sell bonds to the public (and, thus absorb liquid means,
money) - or buy from the public (and, thus, inject liquidity).
Otherwise, they would restrict the amount of printed money and limit
the government's ability to borrow. Even prior to that fashion there
was a widespread belief in the effectiveness of manipulating
exchange rates. This was especially true where exchange controls
were still being implemented and the currency was not fully
convertible. Britain removed its exchange controls only as late as
1979. The USD was pegged to a (gold) standard (and, thus not really
freely tradable) as late as 1971. Free flows of currencies are a
relatively new thing and their long absence reflects this wide held
superstition of central banks. Nowadays, exchange rates are
considered to be a "soft" monetary instrument and are rarely
used by
central banks. The latter continue, though, to intervene in the
trading of currencies in the international and domestic markets
usually to no avail and while losing their credibility in the
process. Ever since the ignominious failure in implementing the
infamous Louvre accord in 1985 currency intervention is considered
to be a somewhat rusty relic of old ways of thinking.
Central banks are heavily enmeshed in the very fabric
of the commercial banking system. They perform certain indispensable services
for the latter. In most countries, interbank payments pass through the
central bank or through a clearing organ which is somehow linked or reports
to the central bank. All major foreign exchange transactions pass through
- and, in many countries, still must be approved by - the central bank.
Central banks regulate banks, licence their owners, supervise their operations,
keenly observe their liquidity. The central bank is the lender of last
resort in cases of insolvency or illiquidity.
The frequent claims of central banks all over the world
that they
were surprised by a banking crisis looks, therefore, dubious at
best. No central bank can say that it had no early warning signs, or
no access to all the data - and keep a straight face while saying
so. Impending banking crises give out signs long before they erupt.
These signs ought to be detected by a reasonably managed central
bank. Only major neglect could explain a surprise on behalf of a
central bank.
One sure sign is the number of times that a bank chooses
to borrow using the discount windows. Another is if it offers interest
rates which are way above the rates offered by other financing institutions.
There are many more signs and central banks should be adept at reading
them.
This heavy involvement is not limited to the collection
and analysis
of data. A central bank - by the very definition of its functions -
sets the tone to all other banks in the economy. By altering its
policies (for instance: by changing its reserve requirements) it can
push banks to insolvency or create bubble economies which are bound
to burst. If it were not for the easy and cheap money provided by
the Bank of Japan in the eighties - the stock and real estate
markets would not have inflated to the extent that they have.
Subsequently, it was the same bank (under a different Governor) that
tightened the reins of credit - and pierced both bubble markets.
The same mistake was repeated in 1992-3 in Israel - and
with the
same consequences.
This precisely is why central banks, in my view, should
not
supervise the banking system.
When asked to supervise the banking system - central banks
are
really asked to draw criticism on their past performance, their
policies and their vigilance in the past. Let me explain this
statement:
In most countries in the world, bank supervision is a
heavy-weight
department within the central bank. It samples banks, on a periodic
basis. Then, it analyses their books thoroughly and imposes rules of
conduct and sanctions where necessary. But the role of central banks
in determining the health, behaviour and operational modes of
commercial banks is so paramount that it is highly undesirable for a
central bank to supervise the banks. As I have said, supervision by
a central bank means that it has to criticize itself, its own
policies and the way that they were enforced and also the results of
past supervision. Central banks are really asked to cast themselves
in the unlikely role of impartial saints.
A new trend is to put the supervision of banks under a
different "sponsor" and to encourage a checks and balances system,
wherein the central bank, its policies and operations are indirectly
criticized by the bank supervision. This is the way it is in
Switzerland and - with the exception of the Jewish money which was
deposited in Switzerland never to be returned to its owners - the
Swiss banking system is extremely well regulated and well supervised.
We differentiate between two types of central bank: the
autonomous
and the semi-autonomous.
The autonomous bank is politically and financially independent.
Its
Governor is appointed for a period which is longer than the periods
of the incumbent elected politicians, so that he will not be subject
to political pressures. Its budget is not provided by the
legislature or by the executive arm. It is self sustaining: it runs
itself as a corporation would. Its profits are used in leaner years
in which it loses money (though for a central bank to lose money is
a difficult task to achieve).
In Macedonia, for instance, annual surpluses generated
by the
central bank are transferred to the national budget and cannot be
utilized by the bank for its own operations or for the betterment of
its staff through education.
Prime examples of autonomous central banks are Germany's
Bundesbank
and the American Federal Reserve Bank.
The second type of central bank is the semi autonomous
one. This is
a central bank that depends on the political echelons and,
especially, on the Ministry of Finance. This dependence could be
through its budget which is allocated to it by the Ministry or by a
Parliament (ruled by one big party or by the coalition parties). The
upper levels of the bank - the Governor and the Vice Governor -
could be deposed of through a political decision (albeit by
Parliament, which makes it somewhat more difficult). This is the
case of the National Bank of Macedonia which has to report to
Parliament. Such dependent banks fulfil the function of an economic
advisor to the government. The Governor of the Bank of England
advises the Minister of Finance (in their famous weekly meetings,
the minutes of which are published) about the desirable level of
interest rates. It cannot, however, determine these levels and, thus
is devoid of arguably the most important policy tool. The situation
is somewhat better with the Bank of Israel which can play around
with interest rates and foreign exchange rates - but not entirely
freely.
The National Bank of Macedonia (NBM) is highly autonomous
under the
law regulating its structure and its activities. Its Governor is
selected for a period of seven years and can be removed from office
only in the case that he is charged with criminal deeds. Still, it
is very much subject to political pressures. High ranking political
figures freely admit to exerting pressures on the central bank (at
the same breath saying that it is completely independent).
The NBM is young and most of its staff - however bright
- are
inexperienced. With the kind of wages that it pays it cannot attract
the best available talents. The budgetary surpluses that it
generates could have been used for this purpose and to higher world
renowned consultants (from Switzerland, for instance) to help the
bank overcome the experience gap. But the money is transferred to
the budget, as we said. So, the bank had to do with charity received
from USAID, the KNOW-HOW FUND and so on. Some of the help thus
provided was good and relevant - other advice was, in my view, wrong
for the local circumstances. Take supervision: it was modelled after
the Americans and British. Those are the worst supervisors in the
West (if we do not consider the Japanese).
And with all this, the bank had to cope with extraordinarily
difficult circumstances since its very inception. The 1993 banking
crisis, the frozen currency accounts, the collapse of the
Stedilnicas (crowned by the TAT affair). Older, more experienced
central banks would have folded under the pressure. Taking
everything under consideration, the NBM has performed remarkably
well.
The proof is in the stability of the local currency, the
Denar. This
is the main function of a central bank. After the TAT affair, there
was a moment or two of panic - and then the street voted confidence
in the management of the central bank, the Denar-DM rate went down
to where it was prior to the crisis.
Now, the central bank is facing its most daunting task:
facing the
truth without fear and without prejudice. Bank supervision needs to
be overhauled and lessons need to be learnt. The political
independence of the bank needs to be increased greatly. The bank
must decide what to do with TAT and with the other failing
Stedilnicas?
They could be sold to the banks as portfolios of assets
and
liabilities. The Bank of England sold Barings Bank in 1995 to the
ING Dutch Bank.
The central bank could - and has to - force the owners
of the
failing Stedilnicas to increase their equity capital (by using their
personal property, where necessary). This was successfully done
(again, by the Bank of England) in the 1991 case of the BCCI scandal.
The State of Macedonia could decide to take over the obligations
of
the failed system and somehow pay back the depositors. Israel
(1983), the USA (1985/7) and a dozen other countries have done so
recently.
The central bank could increase the reserve requirements
and the
deposit insurance premiums.
But these are all artificial, ad hoc, solutions. Something
more
radical needs to be done:
A total restructuring of the banking system. The Stedilnicas
have to
be abolished. The capital required to open a bank or a branch of a
bank has to be lowered to 4 million DM (to conform with world
standards and with the size of the economy of Macedonia). Banks
should be allowed to diversify their activities (as long as they are
of a financial nature), to form joint venture with other providers
of financial services (such as insurance companies) and to open a
thick network of branches.
And bank supervision must be separated from the central
bank and set
to criticize the central bank and its policies, decisions and
operations on a regular basis.
There are no reasons why Macedonia should not become a
financial
centre of the Balkans - and there are many reasons why it should.
But, ultimately, it all depends on the Macedonians themselves.
Sam Vaknin ( http://samvak.tripod.com
) is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After
the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Global
Politician, Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb,
a United Press International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the
editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory
and Suite101.
Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of
Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at http://samvak.tripod.com
Published - April 2006
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